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Abstract
Based on the “acquiring-a-company”game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985),
we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby
we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sell-
ers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of information disclo-
sure as prescribed by two recently implemented directives of the European Union,
the Transparency and the Takeover-Bid Directive. Our theoretical and experimen-
tal results suggest a welfare-enhancing effect of compulsory information disclosure.
Hence, the EU Transparency and the EU Takeover-Bid Directive should both be
welfare enhancing.
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1. Introduction
It is well known that insider information might preclude trade (see, e.g., Ak-
erlof, 1970) and reduce welfare. One institutional measure to prevent this is the
compulsory disclosure of private information, i.e., legally forcing the informed party
to reveal its superior information. Mergers and acquisitions are a main focus in this
respect since asymmetric information may prevent desirable takeovers.
In the European Union, two central directives are related to the acquisition of
firms: The Transparency Directive1 and the Takeover-Bid Directive2. The main
intention of the Transparency Directive is to improve investor protection and mar-
ket confidence. Its aim is to simplify access to corporate information across EU
member states, discourage secret stock building in listed companies, and reduce
legal uncertainty.3 The goal of this directive is therefore to mitigate the problem of
asymmetric information for buyers/investors.
The Takeover-Bid Directive, to the contrary, improves the information rights
of potential sellers of a firm, e.g., its shareholders. It requires that “a decision to
make a [takeover] bid is made public without delay”4. Furthermore “an offerer is
required to draw up and make public in good time an offer document containing the
information necessary to enable the holders of the offeree company’s securities to
reach a properly informed decision on the bid.”5 Hence, potential investors intend-
ing to acquire a firm have to publicly place their takeover bid and disclose further
information in the offer document.
Although the intention of these legal measures is clearly to reduce or avoid asym-
metric information by compulsory disclosure either on the seller or buyer side, it
will depend on the market environment whether these measures actually enhance
welfare. In this paper we theoretically and experimentally explore the effects of
compulsory disclosure of information by using the“acquiring-a-company”game. Ex-
tending the scenario discussed by Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we distinguish
two settings with asymmetric information, namely
1Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to in-
formation about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market.
2Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids.
3This is achieved by “establishing requirements in relation to the disclosure of periodic and
ongoing information about issuers whose securities are already admitted to trading on a regulated




• one with only the seller and
• one with only the buyer
knowing the value of the firm. Since we are interested in the effects of compulsory
information disclosure, we analyze the effect of a transition from each of the two
asymmetric information cases to a setting where both parties are informed about
the firm’s value. To the contrary, previous experimental studies on the “acquiring-a-
company” game focused on one specific setting in isolation (e.g., where the seller is
better informed, see Ball et al., 1991, Selten et al., 2005, Foreman and Murnighan,
1996, Dittrich et al., 2012, Grosskopf et al., 2007) and not on the transition from
asymmetric to symmetric information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the pos-
sible institutional settings together with their game theoretic benchmark solutions
and welfare implications. The hypotheses to be tested experimentally are stated in
Section 3. Section 4 describes the experimental design. Experimental results are
illustrated and statistically analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. The “acquiring-a-company” game
This game involves a (potential) seller S and a (potential) buyer B. The seller
owns a company he evaluates by qv, where q ∈ (0, 1) is an exogenously given and
commonly known parameter and v ∈ (0, 1) is the value of the company for the
buyer to whom he wants to sell the company. Thus the evaluations of the firm are
perfectly and linearly correlated, and due to q < 1 trade is welfare enhancing. If
p denotes the price for selling the company to B, the gains from trade are v − p
for B and p − qv for S such that the surplus amounts to (1 − q)v. We assume
throughout that v is randomly distributed according to the uniform density on the
support [0, 1] and that there is common (knowledge of) risk neutrality. Samuelson
and Bazerman (1985) assume that only S is aware of v and that
(i) buyer B proposes a price p ∈ [0, q] that
(ii) seller S can accept (δ(p) = 1) or reject (δ(p) = 0), the latter resulting
in zero payoffs for both parties. Altogether the payoff is δ (p) (v − p) for B, and
δ (p) (p− qv) for S.
Theoretically one can distinguish four different information structures where the
baseline scenario assumes no information at all about the realization of v.
Scenario (NN): Neither buyer nor seller know the realization of v.
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Since v is uniformly distributed on the unit interval, the seller’s expected payoff
in case of δ(p) = 1 is
EπS(p) = p− q/2
so that S would accept (δ∗ (p) = 1) only if p ≥ q/2. Since the buyer expects
EπB(p) = 1/2− p
from trade, the optimal price offer of B is pNN = q/2. S will accept this offer,
leading to trade. The expected payoffs for buyer and seller are
EπNNB = (1 − q)/2 and Eπ
NN
S = 0 . (1)
Buyer B exploits ultimatum power and acquires the total expected surplus
(1− q)/2 from trade.
The information structure analyzed by Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) is
Scenario NI: Whereas seller S is perfectly informed about the realization of v, it
is commonly known that buyer B only knows the distribution of v.
Clearly, δ∗ (p) = 1 is optimal only if p/q ≥ v > 0. The buyer’s expected payoff








In case of q ≤ 1/2, the optimal price offer by the buyer is pNI = q, and the
expected payoffs for the buyer and the seller are
EπNIB = (1− 2q)/2 , Eπ
NI
S = q/2 . (2.1)
These results imply welfare-enhancing trade as in Scenario NN but now with
more balanced gains from trade.
In case of q > 1/2, however, EπB < 0 for p > 0 so that the optimal price offer
of B is pNI = 0. Similar to the lemon problem as studied by Akerlof (1970), there
will be no trade due to adverse selection, and the (expected) payoffs are
EπSBB = 0 , Eπ
SB
S = 0 . (2.2)
(2)
In the third
Scenario IN it is commonly known that only the buyer is aware of the realization
of v while the seller only knows the distribution of v. Thus the interaction becomes
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a signaling game since buyer B may or may not reveal his information about v by
his price offer p(v) to the seller. The seller obviously expects the price to be below











Due to q < 1, this payoff function is concave in p and positive in the interval
p ∈ ( q2−q , 1), rendering p
IN = q2−q the buyer’s optimal price offer. The expected




(v − q/(2− q))dv =
2(1− q)2
(2− q)2
, EπINS = 0 , (3)
so that the expected payoff for B is lower than in scenario NN for all q > 0, due
to trade being restricted to v ≥ pIN = q/(2− q) > 0. Thus the solution is partly v-
revealing in that from observing p = 0 the seller can conclude that v < pIN , whereas
from observing p = pIN he infers that v ≥ pIN , i.e., whether trade is excluded may
depend on the v-range.
In the fourth
Scenario II both, buyer and seller, are known to be informed about the realization
of v.
The buyer again exploits ultimatum power by offering pII = qv. This leads to
the expected payoffs
EπIIB = (1 − q)/2 , Eπ
II
S = 0 , (4)
which coincide with those in scenario NN. The same expected payoffs, however,
rely on a crucial difference in that seller S earns nothing for all v ∈ (0, 1) in scenario
II, whereas in scenario NN his payoff q(1/2 − v) is v-dependent and specifically
negative for v > 1/2.
The results of all scenarios are summarized in table 1: The seller is ex ante best
off when privately informed about v, i.e., if he has exclusive information. Otherwise,
his expected payoff is zero. The buyer is best off when both players are either
informed or uninformed about v.
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Seller is informed about v
no yes
Buyer is informed no
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qv, 1−q2 , 0
)
II
Table 1: Benchmark solutions regarding prices and payoffs for B and S
3. Compulsory disclosure of information
Compulsory disclosure as prescribed by the Transparency Directive and the
Takeover-Bid Directive can be captured by a transition from scenario IN or NI,
respectively, with asymmetric information to information structure II, where the
value of the firm, v, is common knowledge. Table 2 shows the theoretical imple-
mentation of the institutional changes envisaged by the directives.
Takeover-Bid Directive Transparency Directive
Asymmetric information only buyer knows v (IN) only seller knows v (NI)
↓ ↓ ↓
Symmetric information both know v (II) both know v (II)
Table 2: Institutional changes envisaged by the EU Directives
The EU Transparency Directive aims to improve access to information for po-
tential buyers of a firm. In our model this is captured by the change from scenario
NI to II. Since the sum of payoffs comprises the gains from trade, we conclude that
this change in information is welfare enhancing in case of q > 1/2 and leads to6
Hypothesis 1. Eliminating asymmetric information for the potential buyer is wel-
fare enhancing only in case of q > 1/2.
The EU Takeover-Bid Directive intends to reduce asymmetric information for
the seller, an institutional change captured by a transition from scenario IN to II.
Comparing the sum of expected payoffs in both scenarios shows that this change in
information is welfare enhancing. Thus we state
6Note that in all our analyzes we abstract from the costs of information acquisition.
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Hypothesis 2. Eliminating asymmetric information for the seller is welfare en-
hancing.
Although there is no effect of the EU Transparency Directive on welfare for
q ≤ 1/2, the benchmark proposes that the elimination of asymmetric information
affects the payoffs of buyer and seller: while the buyer’s payoff increases for all
values of q, the seller’s payoff decreases for low values q ≤ 1/2. This leads to
Hypothesis 3. Eliminating asymmetric information for the potential buyer in-
creases the payoff for the buyer for all values of q, but decreases the payoff for
the seller for low values q ≤ 1/2 only.
To the contrary, for the EU Takeover-Bid Directive the benchmark proposes
that the newly informed seller does not gain from compulsory disclosure, whereas
the buyer’s payoff increases. This leads to our final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. Eliminating asymmetric information for the potential seller in-
creases the payoff for the buyer, while the payoff for the seller is left unchanged.
Altogether, as a response to the EU directives compulsory disclosure leads to
welfare gains, at least in case of q > 1/2. For both directives we further derive that
the buyer gains from compulsory disclosure, whereas the seller possibly loses.
4. Experimental design and setup
The experimental treatments describe the institutional transitions from either
one of the scenarios with one-sided information, NI or IN, to scenario II, where
both, seller and buyer, are informed about the value of the firm (see table 2), im-
plemented in a within-subjects design.In treatment TBD (Takeover-Bid Directive)
we consider the change from scenario IN to scenario II, whereas in treatment TD
(Transparency Directive) we implement the transition from scenario NI to scenario
II.
The subjects are either in role B, a potential buyer, or in role S, a potential
seller. Participants were randomly assigned one of the two roles and remained in
that role throughout the experiment.
In treatment TBD, participants first played three rounds of the IN game (phase 1),
followed by three rounds of the II game (phase 2). In treatment TD, participants
first played three rounds of the NI game (phase 1), followed by three rounds of the
II game (phase 2). Thus in both treatments, TBD and TD, participants played the
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“acquiring-a-company”game for a total of six rounds, three rounds each in phase 1
and phase 2.
In each of the three rounds, participants were confronted with one of three
possible q-values, q ∈ {0.35, 0.45, 0.55}. The informed party, i.e., B-participants in
the IN game, S-participants in the NI game, and both, B- and S-participants, in
the II game, were subsequently confronted with 15 randomly drawn realizations of
v. These realizations, including their order of appearance as well as the order of
the three q-values, were drawn before the experiment and held constant over all
treatments and sessions. In phase 1 the informed side of the market had to state
a price for every v: informed B-participants (scenario IN) had to state the buying
price BP they would be willing to pay to acquire the company and informed S-
participants (scenario NI) had to state the selling price SP at which they would
be willing to sell the company. In phase 2 (scenario II) both were informed about
the value of v and had to state a price for every one of the 15 random v-values.
Hence, in the IN game B-participants had to make 45 decisions, in the NI game
S-participants had to make 45 decisions, and in the II game both, B- and S-
participants, had to make 45 decisions. The uninformed party in phase 1, however,
could only state one price in every round, knowing only the distribution of v ∈
[0, 100] but not its realized value.
The price choices of participants reflected their respective acceptance thresholds
for trade to take place: S-participants’ price offers SP reflected the minimum price
at which they would be willing to sell the company, while B-participants’ price offers
BP corresponded to the maximum price they would be willing to pay to acquire the
company. If the price offered by a potential buyer exceeded the threshold price of a
potential seller, the company was sold at the offered price, otherwise no trade took
place. The resulting payoffs, (v−p) for buyers and (p−qv) for sellers, were specified
formally as well as verbally in the instructions to be found in the Appendix. There
was no feedback between rounds. At the end of the experiment, each B-participant
was randomly matched with an S-participant, and for each round one realization
of v was randomly chosen for payment, i.e., participants were paid for six decisions
altogether.
All sessions started with a set of control questions clarifying and testing whether
the decision tasks and the calculation of payoffs were fully understood by the partic-
ipants. To emphasize that negative payoffs were possible, an appropriate example
was included in the control questions. After all participants had answered all con-
trol questions correctly, three trial rounds, including feedback to participants, took
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place to ensure they understood the consequences of their decisions.
After completion of phases 1 and 2 of the experiment, participants were asked
to fill out a postexperimental questionnaire designed to collect demographic infor-
mation and elicit participants’ risk tolerance (see Holt and Laury, 2002).
Throughout the experiment, payoffs were calculated in Experimental Currency
Units (ECU) and converted into euros at a given exchange rate (6 ECU = 1 euro)
at the end of the experiment. Besides a show-up fee of 5 euros, participants received
their payoff earned by 6 randomly drawn decisions (one for each of the six rounds) as
well as the reward for the lottery question in the postexperimental questionnaire as-
sessing risk tolerance. The experiment was programmed in z-tree (see Fischbacher,
2007). We ran 3 sessions with 32 participants each for each treatment. Participants
were students of Friedrich Schiller University Jena (Germany). On average, one
session lasted about 90 minutes, and the average payment of participants amounted
to 16.36 euros including the show-up fee and the reward for the lottery question.
Earnings ranged from 5.10 to 47.30 euros.
When payoffs (not including the show-up fee and the reward for the lottery
question) summed up to a negative value, participants had the choice to either pay
their debt out of pocket or to work it off by completing an effort task (i.e., counting
the letter “t” in a text).7 All 8 (8.3%) participants confronted with negative payoffs
chose to work off their debt.
5. Experimental results
We start with a short description of the results concerning phase 1 in both
treatments, i.e., either only the seller is informed about the value of the firm (phase
1 in TD) or only the buyer is informed (phase 1 in TBD).
In phase 1 of treatment TD, the informed sellers set a price acceptance level
for every of the 15 randomly drawn v-values (SP ), while participants in the role
of buyers choose only one price (BP ) in every round. Figure 1 depicts the mean
choices of BP and SP in the three rounds of phase 1.
7For every completed extra exercise participants could work off 5 euros. As the negative payoff
could not be compensated by the show-up fee and the reward for the lottery question in the
postexperimental questionnaire, participants who chose to work received a positive payoff in the
end.
9

















SP q=0.35 SP q=0.45 SP q=0.55
BP q=0.35 BP q=0.45 BP q=0.55
Figure 1: TD phase 1
The price acceptance levels of sellers increase in v and q. For an interpretation
of this result, recall that the payoff for a seller is given by the expression (BP − qv)
and decreases in q and v. Given that payoffs become negative when BP < qv,
participants apparently understood the interplay of own payoff and the parameters
q and v, as they adapted their decisions to avoid negative payoffs by choosing a
higher price acceptance level SP for higher values of q and v. The same is true for
treatment TBD, where only buyers are informed about v; see figure 2.
Comparing phase 1 of both treatments reveals the basic difference, namely that
the intersection points of the curves BP and SP are situated further to the left in
treatment TD. Recall that trade only takes place in case of BP ≥ SP , what is ful-
filled left of the intersection points of the respective curves in figures 1 and 2. Thus,
comparing the treatments shows that trade is conducted more often in treatment
TBD than in treatment TD, where the informed seller sets higher acceptance levels
in fear of negative payoffs.
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SP q=0.35 SP q=0.45 SP q=0.55
BP q=0.35 BP q=0.45 BP q=0.55
Figure 2: TBD phase 1
With respect to the transitions from phase 1 to phase 2 in both treatments,
hypothesis 1 implies that in the setting where the potential buyer of a firm is not
informed about the realization of v (treatment TD) welfare increases as a result
of compulsory information disclosure only in case of q > 1/2. For q ≤ 1/2 the
elimination of asymmetric information is not predicted to have an effect on welfare.
A simple comparison of the sum of payoffs in phases 1 and 2 in treatment TD reveals
that, other than predicted by the theoretical benchmark model, the elimination of
asymmetric information increases welfare for any value of q (see table 3).
q = 0.35 q = 0.45 q = 0.55
Sum of payoffs in phase 1 12,326.6 8,541.5 5,211.4
Sum of payoffs in phase 2 14,029.6 10,608.4 7,865.5
∆ (phase 2-phase 1) 1,703.9 2,066.9 2,654.1
Table 3: Comparison of the sum of payoffs in phases 1 and 2 in treatment TD
Mann-Whitney tests show that the differences between the two phases in treat-
ment TD are all significant: on a 5% level for q = 0.35, on a 1% level for q ∈
{0.45, 0.55}. Thus compulsory disclosure as prescribed by the EU Transparency
Directive increases welfare for all values of q, and this effect is strongest for the
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highest value q = 0.55. This finding provides some support for hypothesis 1: while
the benchmark solution predicted a welfare-enhancing effect only for high values
q > 1/2, our experimental data reveal a positive effect for all q-values, but paral-
leling the benchmark solution this positive effect is strongest for q > 1/2. We thus
obtain
Result 1. In treatment TD compulsory disclosure increases the sum of payoffs for
all values of q where the effect is strongest for the highest value q = 0.55.
Hypothesis 2 refers to the welfare-enhancing effect of eliminating asymmetric
information for the seller of a firm as prescribed by the EU Takeover-Bid Directive.
The differences between the sum of payoffs in phases 1 and 2 reported in table
4 are all significant (Mann-Whitney tests, p-value ≤ 0.01 for q = 0.35, p-value ≤
0.03 for q = 0.45, and p-value ≤ 0.04 for q = 0.55), meaning that welfare increases
through compulsory information disclosure only for the smaller values of q, whereas
it decreases for q = 0.55.
q = 0.35 q = 0.45 q = 0.55
Sum of payoffs in phase 1 9,476.3 8,522.2 10,789.6
Sum of payoffs in phase 2 14,974.8 10,903.8 7,474.5
∆ (phase 2-phase 1) 5,498.4 2,381.6 -3,315.1
Table 4: Comparison of the sum of payoffs in phases 1 and 2 in treatment TBD
Thus the positive effect on welfare decreases in q as the difference in welfare
between phases 1 and 2, ∆, decreases and even becomes negative for the highest
realization of q. The explanation at hand is that q has a crucial effect on how many
of the possible acquisitions are actually realized. By negatively affecting trade, an
increasing level of q therefore reduces welfare. For an intuition, recall that a seller’s
payoff is given by BP−qv. When a seller becomes informed about the v-value, given
a high value of q, he should hence increase his price acceptance level SP to avoid
negative payoffs, thus potentially precluding trade. From table 5 one can calculate
that the relative frequency with which trade takes place increases when moving
from phase 1 to phase 2 for all values of q: by 25.9% for q = 0.35 (Mann-Whitney
test, p-value≤ 0.01), by 20.2% for q = 0.45 (Mann-Whitney test, p-value≤ 0.01),
and by 10% for q = 0.55 (Mann-Whitney test, p-value≤ 0.02). However, although
information disclosure induces trade, this effect becomes significantly weaker the
higher the value of q (the decrease from 59.9% for q = 0.35 to 50.5% for q = 0.55 is
significant with p-value≤ 0.05, Mann-Whitney test).
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q = 0.35 q = 0.45 q = 0.55
Phase 1 33.5% 30.0% 40.5%
Phase 2 59.4% 50.8% 50.5%
Table 5: Relative frequencies of trade in treatment TBD
Thus the finding that in the TBD treatment compulsory information disclosure
reduces welfare for q = 0.55 draws from the fact that due to higher price acceptance
levels SP , fewer acquisitions are made the higher q. We summarize these findings
in
Result 2. In treatment TBD compulsory disclosure increases the sum of payoffs
for q ∈ {0.35, 0.45} and decreases it for q = 0.55.
Enforcing the EU Takeover-Bid Directive would thus also be welfare enhancing but
only for small values of q.
Let us now turn to the payoffs of buyers and sellers (hypotheses 3 and 4). Our
analysis suggests that in treatment TD the seller suffers from information disclosure
for low values q ≤ 1/2, whereas the formerly uninformed buyer gains for all q-values
(hypothesis 3). Conducting Mann-Whitney tests, we find for all q-values that in
treatment TD buyers’ payoffs are significantly higher in phase 2 (p-value≤ 0.01),
whereas sellers’ payoffs are significantly lower in phase 2 (p-value≤ 0.02) for q ∈
{0.35, 0.55} and the difference for q = 0.45 is insignificant. This only partly supports
hypothesis 3 as the sellers’ payoffs should have revealed a nonsignificant change for
the highest value q = 0.55.
For treatment TBD the theoretical benchmark proposes that the buyers’ payoffs
increase, whereas sellers do not gain from becoming informed (hypothesis 4). The
experimental data, however, suggest that sellers’ payoffs significantly increase when
buyers’ private information is disclosed (Mann-Whitney test, p-value ≤ 0.02), while
buyers’ payoffs do not significantly change. This finding contradicts hypothesis 4
what might be explained by the fact that payoffs derived in the theoretical bench-
mark model are expected payoffs using an expectation of the random v, whereas in
phase 2 of the experiment participants set prices knowing the realization of v.
Both findings are summarized in
Result 3. In both treatments, TD and TBD, compulsory disclosure significantly
increases the payoff of the less informed party, whereas only in treatment TD the
payoff of the better informed party significantly decreases.
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6. Conclusion
We theoretically and experimentally investigate the welfare implications of in-
stitutional changes as suggested by the EU Takeover-Bid Directive and the EU
Transparency Directive, both of which aim at reducing the negative effects asso-
ciated with insider information. Our experimental treatments begin with market
scenarios characterized by asymmetric information before switching to the situa-
tion where this private information becomes commonly known due to a compulsory
disclosure of information.
We answer our research questions by discussing a case of bilateral trade, namely
the potential takeover of a firm. This has already been analyzed by Samuelson and
Bazerman (1985) who, however, (i) consider only the case of the seller being aware
of his firm’s value and (ii) do not explicitly study the transition from asymmetric
to symmetric information. While we do not deny that a better informed seller rep-
resents the more natural setting of private information, we consider it likely that
the profitability of a firm may also depend on external events about which the po-
tential buyer is better informed. For example, a potential buyer may have learned
that a major customer, e.g., a public authority or a large commercial customer, has
decided to increase its demand to be met by the firm under consideration, while
the seller himself is unaware of this. Moreover, including the scenario in which the
buyer’s price choice is partly information revealing, allows us to analyze the eco-
nomic effects of the Takeover-Bid Directive in addition to those of the Transparency
Directive.
In case of the Takeover-Bid Directive we find a significantly positive effect on wel-
fare even for a low value of the firm, for which no such increase had been predicted
by the theoretical benchmark solution. As regards the Transparency Directive, we
find that for the highest value of the firm a trade-inhibiting effect overcompensates
the positive effect on welfare, while for lower values compulsory disclosure signif-
icantly increases welfare. For both directives compulsory disclosure significantly
increases the payoff of the less informed party, whereas only in case of the Trans-
parency Directive the payoff of the better informed party, the seller, significantly
decreases.
Overall, our theoretical and experimental results are confirmatory of the con-
sidered EU directives in that the compulsory disclosure of information is welfare





Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please remain silent and turn
off your mobile phones. Please read the instructions carefully and note that they are
identical for each participant. From now on, you may not talk to other participants.
In case you do not follow these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experi-
ment as well as from any payment. You will receive 5 euros for participating in this
experiment. The participation fee and any additional amount of money you will
earn during the experiment will be paid out to you in cash at the end of the session.
All participants will be paid individually, i.e., no other participant will know how
much you earned. All monetary amounts in the experiment will be paid in ECU
(experimental currency units). At the end, all earned ECUs will be converted into
euros using the following exchange rate:
6 ECU = 1 euro.
Procedure
The experiment consists of the following parts: control questions, six rounds di-
vided into two stages, and a final questionnaire. Before starting the first stage, three
practice rounds will be held. After completing stage 1, you will receive the instruc-
tions for the second stage. At the beginning of the experiment, each participant is
randomly assigned one out of two possible roles. One half of the participants will
be assigned the role of a buyer, B; the other half will be assigned the role of a seller,
S. You will remain in the role you have been assigned throughout the experiment,
i.e., in stage 1 and stage 2.
At the end of the experiment, for each of the six rounds, one of your decisions is
selected to determine your payment, i.e., one decision per round. If you suffer a loss
in the six selected decisions, you can pay for it in cash or balance it by completing
additional tasks at the end of the experiment. Please note that these tasks can
only be used to compensate for possible losses, but not to increase your earnings.
Additionally, you will receive a payment for one task from the questionnaire part.
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Hence, you will receive the participation fee and payment for the questionnaire part
in any case.
Detailed description of the experiment
The experiment consists of two stages, each consisting of three rounds.
The procedure of a round in stage 1 is structured as follows:
1. The computer randomly selects 15 values of v between 0 and incl. 100 (v =
0, 1, ..., 100). In this case, each value v between 0 and 100 can be selected with
equal probability.
2. The value v is ONLY announced to the participants [TD: in role S] [TBD:
in role B].
3. Decisions of the participants.
The participant in role B chooses a buying price BP between 0 and incl. 100
(0 ≤ BP ≤ 100).
The participant in role S chooses a minimum selling price SP between 0 and
incl. 100 (0 ≤ SP ≤ 100).
In each of the three rounds of stage 1 only the participants [TD: in role S] [TBD:
in role B] are confronted with 15 randomly selected values of v. These informed
participants select [TD: a selling price SP] [TBD: a buying price BP] particularly
for each of the 15 values of v1, v2, ..., v15. In other words, the participants [TD:
in role S] [TBD: in role B] determine in total 15 [TD: minimum selling prices]
[TBD: buying prices], which can also be identical. The uninformed participants
[TD: in role B] [TBD: in role S] make only one decision per round: they decide
at which [TD: buying price BP] [TBD: minimum selling price SP] they would be
willing to [TD: buy] [TBD: sell]. At the end of the experiment, one of the values of
v is randomly selected for each round. Based on that value, the earnings for sellers
S and buyers B are determined.
If the buying price BP offered by B is less than the minimum selling price SP
by seller S, no sale takes place and no gains from the trade are generated, i.e., the
earnings of S and B are 0.
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If the buying price BP offered by B is higher than or equal to the minimum sell-
ing price SP, seller S accepts the bid made by buyer B, and the following earnings
result from these choices:
The buyer receives the random value v minus the offered buying price BP.
The seller receives the buying price BP proposed by B minus a share in the
amount of x% of the random value v.
The amount of x% varies in the three rounds of a stage and can either correspond
to 35%, 45%, or 55%, while the sequence of these three x-values is determined
randomly.
Therefore, the earnings in the event of a trade can be summarized as follows:
B receives (v −BP ),
S receives (BP − x%v),
where x% may correspond to either 35%, 45%, or 55%.
Please note that profits from the sale are only positive for both participants –
buyer B and seller S – if the randomly selected value v is higher than the buying
price BP and this, in turn, is higher than x% v (v > BP > x%v).
If v is less than BP, buyer B receives a negative payoff due to the purchase. If
BP is less than x% v, seller S receives a negative payoff due to the sale.
Therefore, seller S owns a good that has value v for buyer B but is less valuable
for the latter, namely x% of value v. Depending on the buying price BP, on x%
and on the value v, it can be advantageous for S to sell to B.
You will receive the instructions for stage 2 at the end of stage 1.
Before stage 1 of the experiment begins, we will ask you to answer a few control
questions to help you better understand the rules of the experiment. This will be
followed by practice rounds, to become familiar with the structure of the experi-
ment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
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Instructions for stage 2
In each of the three rounds of stage 2, both participants (in role S and B) are
confronted with 15 values of v randomly drawn by the computer. Participants in
role B decide on a buying price BP for each of the 15 values of v1, v2, ..., v15, and
participants in role S choose a minimum selling price SP for each of the 15 values.
At the end of the experiment, one of these values v is randomly selected for each
round and then used to determine the earnings of sellers S and buyers B as in stage
1. The difference to stage 1 consists only in the fact that all participants – instead
of just the participants [TD: in role S] [TBD: in role B] – make their decisions in
each of the three rounds based on knowing the 15 different values of v.
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